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ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS. By Sotirios A. Barber. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1984. Pp. viii, 245. $17.50. 
Since the moment of its ratification, the Constitution has engen-
dered disputes over how and by whom it should be interpreted. 1 So-
tirios Barber's2 On What the Constitution Means represents an attempt 
to provide a comprehensive framework for deciding such questions. 
Constitutional theories have clustered around two approaches - in-
terpretivist and noninterpretivist3 - and within these two groups, 
broad theories of constitutional authority, including the "textual" ap-
proach, the "historical" approach, the "consensus" approach, and 
others have emerged.4 Barber utilizes conceptions from each of these 
theories, combined with a logical analysis of the documenf s provisions 
and their relationships with one another, to reach what he terms an 
"aspirational" theory (p. 10). 
Barber is an interpretivist, and he devotes the first chapter of his 
book to arguing that the Constitution has a meaning independent of 
what anyone in particular believes it to mean (pp. 13-37). His ap-
proach to discovering that meaning is aspirational: the Constitution 
1. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), reprinted in 8 THE WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 311 
(P. Ford ed. 1897) (arguing that to give the judiciary the sole right of constitutional interpreta• 
tion would be despotic). 
2. Professor of Political Science, University of South Florida. 
3. "Interpretivism" has been defined as the theory that •~udges deciding constitutional issues 
should confine themselves to enforcing values or norms that are stated or very clearly implicit in 
the Constitution," as distinguished from "non-interpretivism," meaning the view that "courts 
should go beyond that set of references and enforce values or norms that cannot be discovered 
within the four comers of the document." Ely, Constitutional lnterpretivism: Its Allure and Im-
possibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978). 
4. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (mentioning some nine separately recog-
nized theories of constitutional interpretation). 
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should be understood not as a set of rules whose import must be 
grasped, but as a description of what society ought to be. The Consti-
tution is therefore to be construed by extrapolating from its provisions 
the societal values the framers sought to achieve (pp. 59-61). Barber 
bases this conclusion on the supremacy clause.5 To him, this clause 
does not make sense if one understands the Constitution as a set of 
means to an end (in other words, as a set of rules). If means them-
selves are "supreme," then they must still be pursued even if condi-
tions have changed so that the means no longer achieve the originally 
desired ends (pp. 72-76). To avoid this illogical result, Barber echoes 
Walter F. Murphy6 in seeking a way to describe the Constitution as a 
set of "ends" and thereby make sense of the supremacy clause. Barber 
differs from Murphy in his "aspirational" method of arriving at the 
appropriate "ends." The aspirational approach represents an attempt 
to combine means with ends. 
In describing the aspirational "good society" he argues is envi-
sioned by the Constitution, Barber divides the document (and the re-
mainder of his book) into three parts, representing provisions 
conferring governmental powers, provisions defining constitutional 
rights, and provisions describing governmental institutions. Govern-
mental powers, he asserts, represent means to achieving ends desired 
by the framers (p. 76). Thus, the "enumerated powers" indicate a con-
cern for providing for "national security" and "economic health," 
among other things (p. 76). To determine if a given exercise of power 
is proper, Barber argues, one should decide if the overall purpose 
sought is one of the ends implied by the Constitution's grants of 
power. If the end is found constitutional by this analysis, so also will 
be the means, provided those means do not violate any person's consti-
tutional rights (p. 82). 
As a result of linking constitutional powers with constitutional 
"ends," Barber rejects the "pretextual" use of federal power - that is, 
the invoking of a power to achieve an end not related to that power. 
For example, Barber takes exception to the Supreme Court's use of the 
Commerce Clause7 to justify federal regulation of lotteries, sexual be-
havior, and racially discriminatory practices (p. 90). The Supreme 
Court was wrong, Barber argues, to base its decision in Heart of At-
lanta Motel v. United States8 on the Commerce Clause. If the Civil 
Rights Act of 19649 was valid, he contends, it was only valid under the 
5. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
6. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 756 (1980). 
7. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
8. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
2000g (1964). 
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Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.10 The Com-
merce Clause was intended to further only the "end" of economic 
well-being. Barber sees this kind of pretextual use of power as an un-
constitutional disregard of the fact that federal powers are enumer-
ated, and thus limited. The "enumerated powers" doctrine, he argues, 
was at one time an effective restraint on the federal government, but 
frequeht pretextual uses of power have emasculated this restraint to 
the extent that constitutional rights and institutional procedural norms 
are now the only effective checks on federal power (p. 102). 
Barber follows Ronald Dworkin 11 in characterizing constitutional 
rights as "trumps" which may not be violated, even during an other-
wise valid exercise of governmental power. However, unlike Dworkin, 
who argued that the scope of a right was to be determined only by the 
use of legal precedent, Barber applies his aspirational theory to the 
definition of constitutional rights. Barber uses three factors in decid-
ing the scope of a constitutional right: the extent to which honoring 
such a right is "instrinsically praiseworthy," the language of the Con-
stitution, and the logical status of rights as exemptions from granted 
powers (p. 122). 
Using these factors, Barber defines the extent of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 That clause, he says, provides 
individuals the right not to be harmed by the government unless the 
government has a reason "to believe that what it is doing serves the 
common good" (p. 128). Applying this definition, Barber concludes 
that the government may not constitutionally interfere with a wo-
man's decision to have an abortion, since the government has not pro-
duced any "good reasons" for so interfering (p. 138). 
This conclusion is, of course, controversial, and it illustrates a criti-
cal problem with Barber's approach. Barber's constitutional "aspira-
tions" are to be discovered by the use of textual and logical 
approaches, and a conception of what is praiseworthy. But such a 
maneuver merely relabels these textual, logical, and "praiseworthy" 
approaches; it does not help resolve the underlying dispute. Barber's 
abortion argument boils down to the contention that regulating such a 
private choice is not "praiseworthy," given what he regards as the lack 
of a good reason to do so. But the underlying dispute is over what 
constitutes "good reason" to prohibit abortion (anti-abortionists 
would argue that the mere fact that a fetus is viable is "good reason"). 
Barber recognizes that there will always be disagreement over how 
to define constitutional aspirations. But he argues that in any given 
dispute, only one view will be constitutional. Further, Barber contends 
that even the search for the "right" answer is worthwhile, and that the 
10. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. 
11. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
12. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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very fact that individuals disagree over the correct interpretation of 
the Constitution demonstrates that those individuals assume one inter-
pretation is uniquely correct. However, this argument does not avoid 
the problem that Barber's aspirational approach may be of no use in 
resolving concrete disputes. 
In the final part of his book, Barber asserts that the institutional 
provisions of the Constitution (those describing how the government is 
to be constituted) are not "value-neutral" but, like other provisions, 
suggest the ultimate ends which the framers intended to achieve. 
Thus, even the Constitution's institutional provisions provide clues as 
to what the "good society" looks like (pp. 177-80). 
Barber joins the current debate over judicial activism, 13 arguing on 
the side of the activists. Since the Constitution is supreme, he finds it 
illogical for a judge to subordinate his view of the constitution to the 
policies of another governmental branch. But for Barber, this activism 
works both ways. The legislative powers should remain free to deny 
the validity of judicial constitutional construction (p. 214). That such 
an interpretation may result in a chaotic administration of the law and 
declining respect (and power) for the judiciary does not move Barber. 
For him it is important that the Constitution be construed logically, 
rather than "practically." He accepts the possibility that the Constitu-
tion so construed may fail as effective law (p. 49). 
Barber's argument that the Constitution reflects an aspiration to 
judicial and legislative activism illustrates again the central problem 
with his theory. To reach the aspirations he defines as constitutional, 
Barber relies on historical, textual, and logical arguments. It is with 
regard to these arguments that fundamental disagreements occur, and 
merely synthesizing them under the rubric of "aspirations" does not 
solve the underlying disputes. 
Barber developed his thesis partly as an abstract definition of the 
Constitution, and in this respect his approach is insightful. But 
though he intends otherwise, Barber's aspirational theory will not help 
resolve many concrete disputes. 
13. Compare Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory 
and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 830-32 (1974) Gudicial activism is antimajoritarian), with 
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 199-209 (1952) 
(contending that courts are not antimajoritarian, and furthermore, that they perform valuable 
"educational" functions). 
